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ABSTRACT:   In this article I draw out a fundamental difference between Kant’s and
Husserl’s  take  on  the  problem  of  necessity  in  a  contingent  world.  I  do  so  by
investigating in detail a well-known common feature of both philosophies, namely
a basic understanding of necessary laws of objectivity and cognition in terms of
necessary unities of synthesized manifolds. The fundamental difference between
Kant and Husserl that I trace here concerns the radically different ways in which
the two philosophers understand the origin of unity. While Kant maintains that all
necessary unity, also of the contingently given, has its origin in the “synthetic unity
of the understanding”, Husserl describes how it emerges in and from the given
itself in “syntheses of coinciding”. As a result, the Kantian account leaves us with
the  famous  conclusion  that  reason  only  finds  in  the  contingent  world  those
necessities that it has itself put into it, while, according to Husserl, rigorous science
identifies and describes necessities, i.e., necessary unities of synthesized manifolds,
in a systematic course of genuine discovery.
0. Introduction
That  the  problem  of  necessity  is  of  utmost  importance  for  both  Kant  and
Husserl is obvious. It lies at the heart of the fundamental question of whether
and how “rigorous science” may be saved from the threat of relativism, where
rigorous science is  understood as a system of truths that  are universal  and
necessary (Kant) or essential and apodictic (Husserl). The problem received its
wider social urgency, already in Kant’s time, from the increasing awareness,
even  on  the  side  of  the  general  public,  of  the  fundamental  contingency  of
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human life, which was no longer counterbalanced by an unquestionable order
secured by an omnipotent, omniscient God. It received its concrete scientific
urgency due to the impact of Humean skepticism on philosophical debate as
well  as due to the increasing dominance of the natural  scientific  paradigm,
which promoted the accumulation of observable contingent matters-of-fact. For
Kant as well as for Husserl, then, one task of transcendental philosophy is to
identify  and validate  those  truths  that  retain  their  necessity  amidst  and in
reference to the contingencies of nature and experience. At issue is therefore
not  primarily  the  necessity  of  analytic  truths,  which  concern  the  laws  of
thinking as formulated by formal logic, but the necessity of truths about the
contingent world of experience, i.e., the necessity of synthetic truths. Both Kant
and Husserl believe that this question can only be answered in reference to the
structures of consciousness,  which means that  transcendental  philosophy is,
both in its more Kantian or in its later Husserlian strands, inextricably linked
with the so-called “Copernican Revolution”. According to this model, while
events in space and time are undeniably contingent, transcendental philosophy
aims at uncovering the necessary conditions of those events not directly, but
through  an  analysis  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  their  knowability.  The
attempt to determine necessary truths about objects without reference to these
latter  conditions  is  cast  aside  as  “speculative”  (Kant)  or  “constructivist”
(Husserl) metaphysics and replaced by the attempt to determine a priori truths
about how objects can be known, or how they can appear to consciousness.
This also entails a defense of the transcendental project against reductions to
“empirical” (Kant) or “naturalist” (Husserl) paradigms and a commitment to a
model  of  “rigorous  science”  that  depends  on  a  critical  clarification  of  the
essential structures and activities of the cognizing subject.
However,  there  are  also  obvious  differences  between Kant’s  and Husserl’s
account, for example, in respect to their differing notions of the  apriori; their
fundamentally  different  methods;  and  their  views  on  what  aspects  of
subjectivity are relevant to a transcendental account. Here I focus on another of
difference. It concerns the distinct ways in which Kant and Husserl deal with
the problem of necessity in the contigent world in terms of the relation between
a given sensible manifold and its unity.  Generally speaking, they agree this
much: While the world is  given as a sensible manifold, and, insofar as it  is
given, it is always contingent, its unity may carry, and may be known to carry,
necessity, in which case the unified manifold attains objectivity. Here is where
we find a fundamental difference. To put it briefly: Kant thinks of a necessary
unity as a unity that receives its necessity “top down” from the “highest point”
of reason, i.e., from the transcendental unity of apperception. Husserl, on the
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contrary,  thinks  of  unity  “laterally”,  as  a  unity  of  “coincidence  (Deckung)”,
which  enables  apriori  insight  not  only  into  necessities  that  «reason  itself
produces according to its own plan» (B xiii), as Kant famously claimed, but also
into necessities reason genuinely discovers.
The Kantian account is well-known, but for sake of contrast, I summarize it in
the first section and show how much and, most importantly, why it relies on
the idea that  necessary unity  in sensible manifolds,  and thus any necessity
observable in what is  contingently given,  is  produced by an “effort” of  the
understanding.  In  the  more  extended  second  section,  I  first  reconstruct
Husserl’s counter-position, which makes use of the idea of a passive “synthesis
of  coincidence  (Deckungssynthese)”  in  an  attempt  to  account  for  unity  that
inheres  in  the  perceptually  given.  Then,  I  discuss  Husserl’s  account  of  the
necessary  laws  that  regulate  the  perceptually  given  and that  –  contrary  to
Kant’s position – also originate in it,  and not in reason. Finally, I show that
Husserl’s idea of passive coincidence is operative not only on the level of the
perceptually  given,  but  also  on  the  level  of  cognition,  and  even  a  priori
cognition, namely in eidetic intuition. I argue that this constitutes a profound
difference, not only with regards to the different methods of transcendental
philosophy, but also with regards to their views on the question of necessity in
a contingent world.
1. Kant on Necessity in the Given
Kant’s account of the relation between a sensible manifold and its unity reflects
his separation between the faculties of understanding and sensibility. And yet,
at  first  glance,  the  two faculties  appear  to  be  equal.  While  «pure  intuition
contains only the form under which something is intuited, [...] a pure concept
contains  solely  the  form  of  the  thought  of  an  object  as  such»  (A51/B75).
However, form does not eo ipso carry unity for Kant; it may “lie in the mind”
independently  of  any  given  manifold,  whereas  unity  is  always  unity  of  a
manifold. As such, unity presupposes synthesis; it is unity of a synthesized
manifold. Since synthesis, as «an act of [the subject’s] self-activity», is, in Kant’s
view,  an  «act  of  understanding»  (B130),  unity,  unlike  form,  demands  the
understanding. This is true even in the case of the «unity […] that belongs to
space  and  time»  (B160  n.),  that  is,  for  the  intuitive  unity  of  a  sensible
«manifold, outside or within us»; for while that unity is «given a priori», it is
given,  as  Kant  writes  somewhat  cryptically,  «along  with  (not  in)  these
intuitions» (B 161). A «form of intuition gives us merely manifold» (B160 n.)
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while  the  unity  displayed  in  a  formal  intuition  already  involves  the
understanding in some capacity. The distinction between a form of intuition
and a formal intuition thus gives us a good idea of  what the term “unity”
actually  delivers:  Unity,  for  Kant,  is  what  constitutes  objectivity.  Unity  in
intuition, which is produced by a sensible synthesis, gives intuitions of objects;
unity  of  concepts,  which  is  produced  by  an  intellectual  synthesis,  gives
concepts of objects. In both cases, the unity itself depends on a «higher» unity
(B131), namely on the «original synthetic unity of apperception», which is the
unity of possible self-consciousness. 
According to Kant, I become aware of my “identical self” not by looking into
my soul, or by simply thinking “I”, but only «as regards the manifold of the
presentations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my
presentations» (B 135). Whether I ever do (call them that) or not «depends on
circumstances  or  empirical  conditions»  (B139);  it  «is  entirely  contingent»
(B140). However, if I ever were  unable to call my representations mine, then,
Kant famously holds, they would «either […] be impossible, or at least would
be nothing for me» (B 132). Thus, the unity that guarantees the possibility of self-
consciousness is itself a necessity: «The I think must be capable of accompanying
all my presentations» (B 131; my italics), and thus the original synthetic unity
of apperception is  necessarily valid. It may be called «objective» because it «is
the unity whereby everything manifold given in an intuition is  united in a
concept of the object» (B139). In fact, an object, for Kant, is nothing other than
«that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is united» (B 137).
Kant here speaks of conceptual unity because even though he does not deny
that  there  is  unity  in  intuition  (on  the  contrary,  his  entire  transcendental
deduction ultimately rests on it), he does not think that this unity originates in
sensibility. The origin of unity is the transcendental unity of self-consciousness,
but it is brought about by the understanding, «which itself is nothing more
than  the  power  to  combine  a  priori  and  to  bring  the  manifold  of  given
intuitions  under  the  unity  of  apperception»  (B  135).  In  other  words,  the
understanding prescribes that manifolds are synthesized in such a way that
their  “unity”, i.e.,  the rule or “function” of their unifying synthesis,  can be
thought coherently (“in one consciousness”) by means of a concept. This also
means that these “unified” manifolds can be recognized as presentations  of
objects. 
Whatever  we  are  given  through  the  senses  is  contingent,  i.e.,  out  of  our
control.  Kant  is  clear  about  that.  We  cannot  introduce  unity  at  will  (for
example,  by  means  of  judgment)  into  an  otherwise  completely  arbitrary
manifold, which – due to the fundamental separation of the faculties – is in
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itself foreign to thought. The only reason why we can a priori think conditions
of possibility for objects of experience at all, is that our sensibility is not merely
receptive. It also has forms, namely the forms of intuition, time and space. That
means  that  there  are  temporal  and  spatial  a  priori  manifolds,  which  are
immune to  the  contingency of  the  given.  Secondly,  our  sensibility  also  has
imagination.  We  may  apriori  think  of  such  formal  temporal  manifolds  as
unified,  and,  upon  such  instigation  of  the  understanding,  the  productive
imagination  is  able  a  priori  to  generate  corresponding  unified  formal
intuitions, i.e., schemata of time or space (B 176/A 137 f.; see B 160 n.). Since
the  empirical  synthesis  of  apprehension,  i.e.,  the  synthesis  of  contingent
sensible manifolds which generates perceptions, is subject to time and space as
its  forms,  it  is  also subject  to the same transcendental  unity (B 160)  that  is
displayed in formal intuitions of time and space. As a result, even perceptions,
which are and remain contingent with respect to what is given in them, are subject to
this necessary unity. Since the categories are but different ways of “expressing”
this “unity of understanding” (B xvii), we may also say that perceptions are
“subject to the categories”:
all  synthesis,  the  synthesis  through which  even perception  becomes
possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is cognition
through  connected  perceptions,  the  categories  are  conditions  of  the
possibility of experience and hence hold a priori also for all objects of
experience. (B 161) 
This, according to Kant, explains, on the one hand, why we can a priori know
the universal form and unity of all possible objects of experience (i.e., that they
are  causally  related,  that  they  are  structured  in  terms  of  substance  and
accidents,  and so  forth),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  why thereby  «reason  has
insight only into that which it itself produces according to its own design» (B
xiii). Only with regards to objects  of possible experience can we state that they
necessarily and universally accord with the categories because the categories are
concrete expressions of the subjective condition of experience that is, due to
transcendental  constraints  on  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  “objectively
valid”: the objective unity of self-consciousness (B 139f.). 
The fact that objects of possible experience are thus structured in accordance
with the forms of thought (i.e., the categories) does not mean, for Kant, that we
in any way interfere with what is given to us. Although «all we cognize a priori
about things is what we ourselves put into them» (B xviii), we do not structure,
form, construct, or even produce the given. The point is rather that objects  of
possible  experience,  that is,  objects  regarded with respect to how they can be
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known  to  us,  must  display  this  structure,  or  unity.  With  regards  to  their
existence we cannot know anything about them a priori. With regards to their
nature  as  things-in-themselves,  i.e.,  with  regards  to  what  they  are  like
independently from us, we cannot know anything at all. However, with regards
to  their  knowability,  i.e.,  with regards to  the  formal  conditions  of  how they
appear to us formally (“formaliter spectata”, B 165), we can and, if we believe
Kant, do know their structure a priori.
Kant’s  powerful  conclusion  also  betrays  a  powerful  assumption  (itself  a
result, paradoxically, of his attempt to avoid assumptions). Beyond the, as he
likes  to  emphasize,  exactly  twelve categories  and beyond the  two forms of
sensibility,  which  owe  their  necessary  validity  for  the  given  to  their  being
necessary conditions  for  the cognition of  the given,  the  given qua  given is
radically  contingent  and  has  no  necessary  order  whatsoever.1 The  given  is
given «without having to refer necessarily to functions of understanding» (B
122/ A 89) at all, which is why it is at least possible that «appearances might
possibly be of such a character that the understanding would not find them to
conform  at  all  to  the  conditions  of  its  unity.  Everything  might  then  {...}  be
confused» (B 123/ A 90; my italics).
2. Husserl On Necessity in the Given
Husserl  famously  praises  the  transcendental  deduction  and  the  concept  of
synthesis as two of «Kant’s greatest intuitions», which – unbeknownst to Kant,
of course – already take place «on a phenomenological ground» (Hua 3, 118 f.).
However,  Husserl  considers  the  unity  of  the  sensible  not  an  “effect  of  the
understanding”, but an element of  the given itself. It is important to note how
radically Husserl departs from Kant already on this point. Kant assumes that
what is merely given (when we abstract from any effort by the understanding) is
the  «effect  of  an  object  on  our  capacity  for  presentation,  insofar  as  we are
affected by the object», viz. sensation (B34/A20). However, what is intuitively
given  is  not  reducible  to  sensation,  and  even  what  is  given  in  perception
already  depends  on  syntheses  that  are  subject  to  the  transcendental  unity
1 Given Kant’s account we actually must distinguish between what is perceptually given to
us, which is already subject to the categories and thus subject to necessary laws, and that
which  is  “merely”  given  in  abstraction  from  the  “influence  of  the  understanding”,
namely the sheer matter of intuition which is radically contingent. However, since the
perceptually given has, as it were, no laws of its own, we can also say more generally that
the given is insofar as it is given contingent for Kant. 
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apperception. Hence Kant’s notion of synthesis is based on the idea that «we
cannot present anything as combined in the object without ourselves having
combined it beforehand» (B 130). This is why, for Kant, an object is nothing
other than «that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is
united» (B 137). This claim only makes sense within the framework of Kant’s
distinction  between  objects  as  appearances  and  things-in-themselves.  The
notions of synthesis and of its unity acquire a very different meaning in the
phenomenology of Husserl, who rejects that very distinction as «mythology»
(Hua 7, 235; Hua 36, 66).
In phenomenological  analysis,  Husserl  finds no indication of  a distinction
between the world as it appears to us and a distinct realm of noumena. What
he believes is evident in a  correlation between consciousness and world. This
means not only that consciousness is always “consciousness of…” but also that
the  world  is  always  “world  for  consciousness”.  Husserl  thus  does  not
differentiate  being  into  “being  for  us”  and “being  in-itself”;  rather,  «to  the
essence of  all being belongs  a  relation to  consciousness»  (Hua 36,  36  –  my
italics). In other words, an «object that is, but is not and in principle could not
be an object of  a consciousness, is pure non-sense» (Hua 11, 19f.).  Husserl’s
discovery of this “correlational Apriori” has significant consequences for his
notion of constitution, which provides the framework for his reappropriation
of Kant’s concept of synthesis. First, every constituting by consciousness is at
the same time a self-manifestation of world as it is, not only as it appears to us.
Second,  this  self-manifestation  need  not  correspond  to  any  principles
governing the intellectual sphere of consciousness.
When  there  is  no  active  intellectual  engagement  by  consciousness  (for
example,  in  passive  perception),  the  world  that  is  given  (for  example,
perceptually)  has  no  conceptual  or  propositional  order.  It  is  not,  as  Kant
thought,  subject to the “laws of the understanding”, but the inverse is true:
Any concept or proposition referring to the world is ultimately rooted in this
basic  experience  of  the  given,  namely  as  its conceptualization  and  its
idealization.  Therefore,  while  Husserl  agrees  that  the  question  of  object
constitution  is  one  of  the  most  fundamental  problems  of  transcendental
philosophy, he disagrees with Kant’s view that it is a matter of “constitutive
principles of  the  understanding” and instead moves  the  correlative  process of
constitution center stage.2
2 Although it is common now to speak of “the problem of constitution in Kant”, the term
“constitution” only became a general  terminus technicus in the early 20th century. Kant
actually does not use it explicitly. He uses “constitutive” with regards to principles of the
understanding, but would not speak of synthesis as “constitution”.
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That fundamental difference notwithstanding, Husserl certainly agrees with
Kant’s insight that “synthesis of a manifold” (whether this manifold is given
empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to a cognition (A 77/B 103) and,
like  Kant,  he  understands  constitution  as  dependent  on  the  fundamental
question of unity in a synthesized manifold. In fact, at first glance, Kant’s claim
that synthesis is required for anything «to become an object for me» because
«otherwise, and without that synthesis, the manifold would not unite in one
consciousness»  (B  138)  may appear  almost  indistinguishable  from Husserl’s
claim that objects can only ever «take shape as synthetic unities» (Hua 17, 147).
And indeed, as is well known, Husserl himself draws attention to his proximity
to Kant’s problematic:
Kant  searches  in  subjectivity  […]  for  the  ultimate  explication of  the
sense of objectivity that is cognized in cognition. To this extent we agree
with Kant […]. (Hua 7, 386 – my translation)
However, a closer look reveals a profound distance between Kant and Husserl.
Objects,  for  Husserl,  «take  shape  as  synthetic  unities  in  the  mode  “they
themselves”» (Hua 17, 147 – my italics), not as appearances. Moreover, Husserl
corrects “subjectivity” to «the correlation between subjectivity and objectivity»
(Hua 7, 386 – my translation).3 This also means that despite his enthusiasm for
Kant’s notion of synthesis,  the idea of a “productive imagination”, which is
central to Kant’s transcendental deduction, never could sit right with Husserl
who firmly rejects the idea that consciousness “produces” the given, or even
the unity of the given.4
Husserl  also  rejects  from  the  start  any  understanding  of  synthesis  as  a
psychological  process  in  which  a  “perceptual  image”  is  constructed  out  of
discrete,  non-intentional  sense  impressions.  Already  in  the  Philosophy  of
Arithmetics, he works with the idea, which will become a leitmotif throughout
his work, that awareness of objects involves the direct apprehension of complex
wholes, or unified manifolds, even without requiring higher level intellectual acts,
such as judgments, or mediating representations, such as images. Initially led by
3 The complete passage reads: «Kant sucht in der Subjectivitaet bzw. in der Korrelation
zwischen  Subjectivität  und  Objectivem  die  letzte  Bestimmung  des  Sinnes  der
Objektivität, die durch Erkenntnis erkannt wird. Insofern sind wir mit Kant einig…» 
4 However,  while  he  rejects  the  term,  he  is  inspired by Kant’s  «profound but  obscure
doctrine»  (Hua  11,  275),  from  which  he  takes  that  cognition  requires  more  than
predicative  synthesis  and judgment.  In  fact,  Husserl  appears  to  have understood his
account of passive constitution as the proper clarification of productive synthesis that
Kant himself was unable give (cf. Hua 11, 276).
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materialist  interpretations,  given,  for example,  by the neo-Kantian Friedrich
Lange,5 Husserl therefore takes exception to Kant’s claim that synthesis refers
not only to a «sense of the unity of the parts and the whole» but also to a
«sense of the mental activity (“action of the understanding”) of combining»
(Hua  12,  38).  Husserl  accuses  both  Lange  and  Kant  of  pursuing
«predominantly  metaphysical  tendencies»  which  result  in  a  constructivist
account. Husserl summarizes the target of his objections thus:
Consciousness  itself,  and  thereby  subjectivity,  is  supposed  first  to
originate  out  of  unconscious  impressions  through  a  process  of
synthesis  at  the  highest  level.  Thus  is  the  unity  of  consciousness
explained [by Lange and Kant]. (Hua 12, 40)
Husserl  thus  rejects  Kant’s  account  as  «untenable»  because  it  is  «based  on
essential misunderstandings» regarding the nature of synthesis.6 In his view,
Kant misconstrued synthesis as the “first act of the understanding” because he
simply «failed to notice that  many combinations of  content  are given to us
where no trace of a synthesizing activity that  produces connectedness is to be
found» (Hua 12, 41 – my italics). This early insight of Husserl’s is crucial and
will  remain important throughout his  work, most explicitly in his  notion of
“passive  synthesis”.  According to  this  insight,  Kant,  the  father  of  “critical”
philosophy, appears to have been misled by his own metaphysical assumptions,
which  prevented  him  from  seeing  what  Husserl  considers  obvious:  that
«experience,  and it  alone is decisive here,  shows nothing of such “creative”
processes» (Hua 12, 42).7 Husserl therefore sides with Natorp (and, he believes,
against  Kant),  in  cautioning  us  not  to  misunderstand  the  frequent  talk  of
“mental acts” and “acts of consciousness” as necessarily implying the doings of
a spontaneous Ego. «In talking of “acts”», Husserl already warns in the Logical
Investigations, «we must steer clear of the word’s original meaning: all thought
of activity must be rigidly excluded» (Hua 19, 393 [V § 13]).
5 In the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl extensively cites Friedrich Lange’s Geschichte des
Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (Baedeker: Iserlohn, 1866) as
well as his Logische Studien (Baedeker: Iserlohn, 1877). 
6 The issue here is  not what Kant’s  position actually was.  In fact,  it  is  quite clear that
Husserl’s  reading  is  tendentious.  However,  Husserl’s  understanding  is  what  matters
here, not the question of whether that understanding was accurate. 
7 Husserl is, however, not always being clear enough on this point. See, for example, his
description of sense constitution in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology, where he
says:  «ideal  objects  confront  us  as  subjectively  produced  formations  in  the  lived
experience and doing of the forming» (Hua 9, 25). Ideal objects are the “products” of
intellectual operations (more of this later), but they are not mere fabrications either.
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What’s  more,  there  is,  as  far  as  Husserl  can  see,  no  phenomenologically
legitimate reason to suppose that the origin of unity of sensible syntheses does
not lie in themselves. As we have just seen, Husserl discards the idea, which is
crucial for Kant, that synthesis is «an act of [the subject’s] self-activity» and as
such necessarily an «action of the understanding» (B130). Instead he observes
syntheses  as  occurring  in  different  modes  (active  as  well  as  passive),  on
different levels (pre-predicative and predicative), and with regards to different
kinds of objects (real and ideal, individual and general, etc.). I cannot here trace
Husserl’s observation regarding all of these different aspects of a full account
of  synthesis,  but  I  will  restrict  myself  to the distinctly un-Kantian idea that
syntheses may have unity that is not the result of an “effort” of the subject, let
alone an “effort of the understanding”. According to Husserl, syntheses also
acquire  unity  by  coinciding  (Sich-decken8).  In  such  coinciding,  objects,  i.e.,
unities  of  syntheses,  are  experienced  as  given,  rather  than  made;  they  are
discovered, and not produced. As I discuss in what follows, Husserl thinks of
coincidence (Deckung) as a unity (Deckungseinheit)9 that unfolds in continuous
syntheses according to essential laws that can be identified. As a result, he thinks of
“the given” in a very different way than Kant.  Whereas Kant considers the
given,  insofar  as  it  is  given,  as  radically  contingent,  that  is,  as  lacking  any
necessary order whatsoever; Husserl believes that the given itself is regulated
in essential, and therewith, in necessary ways. 
The notion of “synthesis of coinciding” (Deckungssynthese) is recognized as an
important  element  of  Husserlian  phenomenology  overall.  Already  in  the
Logical Investigations  of 1901, for example, he talks about the “fulfillment” of
signitive  intentions  by  intuitive  intentions  with  which  they  “coincide”.  For
example, in the 6th investigation, the “synthesis of coincidence” refers to the
process by which a signification acquires its evident fulfillment. But Husserl
uses the term “Deckung” also in late texts,  such as the  Cartesian Meditations
(written in 1929) or the «Origin of Geometry», which Husserl wrote in 1936
8 The fact that this verb is reflexive in German emphasizes nicely that it refers to a kind of
“self-unifying” process.  Two things “decken  sich”;  they come together  without  being
brought or put together by a third thing (such as a tertium comparationis or a “combining”
subject). 
9 One  inspiration  for  this  idea  is  obviously  Carl  Stumpf’s  concept  of  “fusion
(Verschmelzung)”, which also lacks active “combining”. Stumpf uses the fusion of tones in
a chord as an example. Although each tone can also be heard without the other, if «they
are sensed at the same time, it is impossible to avoid sensing them as a whole, to avoid
sensing them in the relation of fusion» (STUMPF 1890,  65). Husserl makes reference to
processes of fusion through out his work. 
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and which speaks of coincidence as the self-evidence of identity.10 In fact, the
idea of “coincidence” is operative in all of Husserl’s writings; its fundamental
significance for his  thinking overall  cannot be emphasized enough. In what
follows, I only draw out some ways in which  it marks a profound difference
between his phenomenology and Kant’s philosophy regarding the question of
this essay, namely the question of necessity within the contingently given.
2.1. Coincidence in the Perceptually Given: Husserl’s Constitutive Analysis
Given that consciousness, as Kant had also observed, is always temporal and
can thus only be  conscious of anything in a continuous flux of time, one may
wonder how any sense of unity in the manifold of the temporally given could
ever arise. Even if we keep things simple and consider the example of listening
to a melody, we might think that temporal succession is irreconcilable with the
idea of a unified object.
[...]  if  in  the  course  of  perceptual  lived-experiencing,  the  respective
momentary lived-experiencing has gone over into a new one, thus, past
by,  then  the  new one brings to  consciousness  precisely  a  new tonal
content:  Every  momentary  phase  of  perceiving  [brings  to
consciousness]  its  content  and  no  other.  By  no  means  could  the
consciousness of a tonal process, of a melody arise. (Hua 11, 315)
And yet, the paradox that arises for theoretical reflection notwithstanding, we
have  irrefutable  experiential  evidence  for  the  emergence  of  unity  in  the
continuous unfolding of new phases of perception. The question is not whether
we perceive unified objects – we evidently do – but how we do it.
But we have this consciousness, and during the perceiving, [we have it]
in  every  moment;  we  are  not  only  conscious  of  the  momentary
resounding tone or even of its momentary phase, but [we are conscious
of] the protracted tone itself and the melody – to be sure, as a constant
becoming, constant flowing and elapse. (Hua 11, 315)
The  apparent  paradox,  it  turns  out,  is  the  result  of  a  false  conception of
experience. When we pay attention to our experience of objects, we find that the
flux of consciousness is not given as a mere sequence of momentary “now-
points”.  If  it  were,  it  would never allow for the constitution of a continuous
unity,  neither  of  one enduring  object,  nor  of  one  continuous  stream  of
consciousness.  Thankfully,  this  is  a  problem  only  for  abstract  thought.
Indivisible “now-points” are «sheer  fictions that lead to absurdities» (Hua 10,
10 Cf. Husserl 1970, 360.
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169).  Careful  analyses  of  time-consciousness  show  that  each  Now  has  a
“horizon” of retention (of what is present as just having-been) and a “horizon”
of protention (of what is present as about-to-come). In this horizontal structure,
consciousness actually has a hold on continuity within the flux. However, and
this is how this becomes relevant to our discussion here, this “hold” is not the
result of an explicit effort on the part of consciousness. Retention is not the
same as the “act” of remembering; and protention is not the same as the act of
expecting.  Consciousness  is  passive  in  this  unfolding  of  an  «unbroken
continuity» (ibid.).
Perceptual  objects  show  themselves  to  consciousness  in  an  equally
“horizonal” structure, and they do so too without any active “combining” by
consciousness, let alone any “effort of the understanding”. Here we get to the
core of Husserl’s account of the “given”, namely his analyses of the emergence
of unity within the given in passive syntheses of consciousness. Consciousness is
“passive” here in a double sense: It does not actively perform any operations
on  a  “merely”  given  (e.g.,  on  sense  data,  impressions,  or  the  like);  and  it
experiences the “given” as asserting  itself.11 The “given”, to be more precise,
gives  itself  as  “pregiven”,  i.e.,  as  being  prior  to  and  independent  from any
attempts by consciousness to grasp it.
[O]bjects are pregiven [vorgegeben] to the experiencing subject passively
in experience, and are only experiencable through pregivenness in such
a  way  that  the  subject  merely  exercises  acts  of  receptivity,  acts  of
grasping and then acts of explicating something that is already there,
something that  already appears  … this  latter  realm of  objects  must
precede all activity in general … (Hua 11, 291).
However,  when we suspend our conceptions of objectivity,  we find that the
“pregiven” always appears in «perspectival adumbration», which «manifests
the … object from one side» only. «Every aspect,  every continuity of  single
adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only
sides.» (Hua 11, 3) Abstract thought finds in this succession of “profiles” the
same paradox it found in the stream of consciousness. And yet, here as there,
experiential  evidence  shows  the  emergence  of  unity:  an  «objective  sense
exhibits itself as unity [in] the unending manifolds of possible appearances»
(ibid.),  in  relation  to  which  we  experience  each  profile  as  belonging  to  an
unfolding manifold of profiles of one and the same thing. 
No explanation or “deduction” is given, and, according to the phenomenolo-
11 The  difference  is  subtle  but  important;  for  the  “passivity”  of  consciousness  is  not  a
simple inactivity, but also – as Kant had acknowledged already – a receptivity. 
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gical method, none is needed – neither for the “transcendence” of the object (as
distinct from its the varying presentations we can have of it), nor for its unity
(as one object appearing in a manifold of adumbrations). While Husserl thereby
certainly disappoints Kantian expectations, he delivers what he believes is the
only legitimate “proof”:  methodologically “purified”12 experiential  evidence,
which  verifies  what  Husserl  had  already  observed  in  the  Philosophy  of
Arithmetics: «experience [...] shows nothing of such “creative” processes» (Hua
12, 42) as the ones Kant had “deduced”. While synthesis generates a «sense of
the unity», it does not require a «sense of the mental activity (“action of the
understanding”)  of  combining»  (Hua  12,  38).13 Rather,  what  we  learn  in
reflection on perception is that the «world constitutes itself as a sensuous unity»
(Hua 19,  316,  [VI,  §  65]  –  my italics).  This  “idea”,  then,  is  not  a  dogmatic
assumption,  or  simply  Husserl’s  best  guess.  It  is  an  insight  gained  from
experiential evidence: the world is given and experienced as a pregiven unity. This,
as Husserl states emphatically, «we do not merely think, but we see it to be true»
(Hua 19,  317  [VI,  §  65])  –  even though not  all  our  experiences  fit  together
harmoniously and even though not everything in the world makes sense to us.
Of course,
there are breaks here and there, discordances; many a partial belief is
crossed out and becomes a disbelief, many a doubt arises and remains
unsolved for a time, and so forth. But ultimately, [...] if the world gets an
altered  sense  through  many  particular  changes,  there  is  a  unity of
synthesis in spite of such alterations running through the successive
sequence of universal intendings of the world – it is one in its particular
details [...];  it  is  in itself the  same world. (Hua 11, 101; cf. § 107 – my
italics)
Free  from  the  metaphysical  assumptions  with  which  Husserl  sees  Kant
entering his  transcendental  deduction – first  among them the separation of
sensibility and understanding as fundamentally different sources of cognition,
of which only the understanding can be the source of unity – Husserl’s task is
12 There is no room here to get into the details of Husserl’s method. I only want to remind
the reader that a number of methodic steps are required in order to turn experience into
phenomenological evidence, most importantly the epoché as well as the transcendental
and eidetic reductions.
13 Thus,  Husserl’s  notion of  “passive synthesis”  does not  actually mark a discontinuity
between  his  “early”  and  his  “late”  thought.  It  is  better  understood  as  the  later,
methodologically substantiated, explication of his early insight «that many combinations
of  content  are  given  to  us  where  no  trace  of  a  synthesizing  activity  that  produces
connectedness is to be found» (Hua 12, 41). 
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one of tracking and describing the unity of the world (and the unity of the
consciousness whose world it is)14 to the extent that we have evidence of that unity.
Rather  than  coming  up  with  a  transcendental  deduction  of  the  supposed
“extra-“ or “super-worldly” origin of unity in the possibility of human rational
self-consciousness, Husserl thus sets out to pay attention to the different levels
in which it constitutes itself:
One requires no metaphysical or other theories to explain the agreement of the
course of nature and the “native” regularities of the understanding. Instead of
an  explanation,  one  needs  only  a  phenomenological  clarification  of
meaning,  thinking  and  knowing,  and  of  the  ideas  and  laws  which
spring from these. The world constitutes itself as a sensuous unity: its
very meaning is to be the unity of actual and possible straightforward
percepts. (Hua 19, 316 [VI, § 65] – my italics)
The unity of a perceptual object in the world  manifests itself in a continuous
synthesis of coincidence, which is a  passive synthesis. That is to say, it occurs
without necessary interference by the ego who may or may not engage actively
with it,  for example, by judging the perceptually given. Perception does not
depent on an activity of the ego. The inverse is true. The passive synthesis of
coincidences  in  the  perceptually  given,  as  Husserl  explains  in  the
Dingvorlesung,  «must  lie  at  the  foundation  in  order  for  the  [active]  logical
synthesis, that of identification, to produce the evident givenness of the identity
of the objects appearing in the various perceptions» (Hua 7, 155 – my italics).
And yet, coincidence is obviously not something that occurs in separation from
consciousness. It is the synthesis in which the unity of the world constitutes
itself as a world for consciousness; or, put differently, it is the initial evidence we
have of unity in the perceptually given, which is given to us before we seek it.
In  Husserl’s  eyes,  then,  the  foregoing  of  a  “rigorous”  phenomenological
analysis for the sake of an intellectual “deduction” is Kant’s greatest failure.
Looking  for  the  “highest  point”  on  which  all  unity  hangs  and  thus
philosophizing, as it were, “from above”, Kant misses the evidence that the
phenomenological method uncovers in experience itself.
To  treat  the  intuitive  self-grasping  (Selbsterfassen),  self-possessing
(Selbsthaben), as a puzzle, that is, to fail to comprehend itself, means to
philosophize about evidence top-down (von oben her) instead to look at
evidence itself, to bring itself to evidence. (Hua 30, 326f. – my italics and
translation) 
14 Ultimately, Husserl's investigations of essences circulate around the attempt to establish
the eidos “world” and the eidos “Ego” (see Hua 41).
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Husserl  thus  replaces  the  Kantian  idea  of  legitimation  by  means  of
transcendental arguments with his idea of validation through “intuitive self-
grasping”,  or  phenomenological  evidence.  The  extent  of  that  evidence  in
Husserl’s early work only permits the claim  that the given carries unity and
that this unity is not produced, but discovered by consciousness. For example,
in the 6th Logical Investigation Husserl observes:
[W]e  may handle  the  thing  from all  sides  in  a  continuous  perceptual
series,  feeling  it  over  as  it  were  with  our  senses.  But  each  single
perception in this series is already a percept of the thing. Whether I
look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always
see this book. It is always one and the same thing, and that not merely in
some purely physical sense, but in the view of our percepts themselves.
If individual properties dominate variably at each step, the thing itself
as a perceived unity, is not in essence set up by some overreaching act
founded upon these separate percepts. (Hua 19, 284 [VI, § 47])15
In  Ideas I,  this  insight  becomes integral  to Husserl’s  account of  the noema’s
«relation  to  something  objective»  (Hua  3,  268),  which  involves  two
distinguishable moments. On the one hand, there is «this pure point of unity,
this noematic “object simpliciter”»16; on the other hand, there is «the “object in
the  How of  its  determinations”»  (Hua 3,  268).  The  noema in  its  full  sense
comprises both of these moments. Thus, the object is not “added in thought” to
the sensible manifold, as Kant had maintained. Rather it is grasped in intuition.
In thought, we abstract and separate the unity of the objet from the complex
whole  of  the  noema  and  thus  wrongly  construe  an  un-unified  sensible
manifold, which is in need of a unifying “act of the understanding”. According
to Husserl, this ignores the evident intrinsic reference of the noema to an object
whose  objectivity  and  transcendence  is  precisely  based  on  the  fact  that  it
appears  as  one through the  different  “Hows  of  its  determinations”.  In  this
transcendental account, Husserl maintains that the object is intuitively given as
a regulative unity in a nexus of noemata that displays a «form of unification in
agreement (Einigungsform der Verträglichkeit)» (Hua 3, 336).17 In this unity, every
further noema is experienced as an “enrichment” of «the same physical thing-
15 It is easy to see that the problem of genesis was already “on the horizon” in Husserl’s
early work (cf. STEINBOCK 2001, xxxi), as Husserl himself acknowledges (see fn. 19).
16 In a footnote, Husserl adds in obvious reference to Kant’s “transcendental object = X” (A
109): «“object simpliciter” = X». 
17 In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl speaks of «rules of compossibility (Kompossibilität)»
that regulate whether adumbrations can – simultaneously or successively – stand togeth-
er (cf. Hua 1, 109). 
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X» which remains open to further amplifications (or corrections) of its sense in
further  perceptions.  Husserl  concludes  about  the  perceptually  given:  «the
process  is  thus  an  endless  one;  accordingly,  no  intuitive  seizing  upon  the
physical  thing-essence  can be  so  complete  that  a  further  perception cannot
noematially contribute anything new to it» (Hua 3, 311f.).
However,  a transcendent  object  always  appears  in  “adumbrations
(Abschattungen)”  or  profiles,  and  never  in  its  entirety,  its  adumbrations  or
profiles  are  experienced  as  precisely  its adumbrations.  The  object  is  thus
constituted
in  certain  concatenations  of  consciousness  (Bewußtseinszusammenhän-
gen) which themselves bear an intuitible (einsehbare) unity in so far as
they, by virtue of their essence, carry with themselves the consciousness of
an identical X. (Hua 3, 281 – trans. modified; my italics) 
To  capture  the  open-ended  sense  of  the  unity  of  an  object  across  the
multiplicity of its “adumbrations” or “profiles”, Husserl refers to the “one and
the same thing” as an «idea in the Kantian sense» (Hua 3, 297 f.). Although it
can never be displayed fully in experience, it is evident in the regulative unity
of coincidence which integrates new perceptions as further determinations of
the same object. Thus, the object’s «perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated
(vorgezeichnet) as “Idea”» (Hua 3, 298):
We first of all seize upon the unfulfilled idea of the physical thing and
this  individual  physical  thing as  something which is  given “so far,”
precisely  as  far  as  the  harmonious  intuition  “reaches,”  but  thereby
remains  determinable  “in  infinitum”.  The  “etc.”  is  an  evident  and
absolutely indispensable moment in the thing-noema. (Hua 3, 312)
In other words, the object’s objectivity is never fully given but is still, as an
idea, an essential moment of the noema. It refers to the sense we have of the
unity of «the “object (Gegenstand)”, the “Object (Objekt)”, the “Identical”» (Hua
3, 271; cf. § 132), which is always co-meant in the noema. In other words, the
noema  is  unified “sense”  insofar  it  presents  certain  determinations  as
determinations of an object that could be determined differently and that is
thus irreducible to any particular way in which it is presented. In other words,
a perceptual object is immediately experienced as something that could also be
experienced differently (e.g., from different angles, from a greater distance, in a
different light etc.); and it is experienced as one object by virtue of being noted
as a unity of coinciding in different perceptions of it.
Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology maybe understood as an attempt to
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bring this task to completion in what we may consider his alternative to Kant’s
transcendental  deduction.  Given  Kant’s  belief  that  sensibility  “by  itself”
delivers nothing but sense impressions, he must search for the origin of unity
elsewhere. He thus deduces the necessity of an act that «gathers the elements
for cognition and unites them to [form] a certain content» (A 78/ B 103) and is
itself subject to the transcendental unity of apperception. By contrast, Husserl
is forced, by the demands of his own method, to show the “origin” of unity –
understood as the process of its genesis – in experience itself. A clarification of
the synthesis of coincidence in the perceptually given thus becomes the task of
genetic phenomenology.
2.2 The Laws of Coincidence in the Perceptually Given: Husserl’s Genetic Analysis
It makes sense that Husserl begins his lectures on Analyses Concerning Passive
Synthesis with an observation that  he considers firmly established in earlier
analyses:
External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something
that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. (Hua 11, 3)
Its pretense is based on its involving not only elements that are “genuinely”
perceived but also ones that are only «“co-meant” as co-present» (Hua 11, 4). It
always  includes  profiles  of  the  perceived  object  that  are  not  actually  seen,
heard, touched, etc., but that are still present as just having-been perceived, or
as just about-to-be perceived. Due to the continuous unfolding of perception in
this «system of referential implications» (Hua 11, 5), what is perceived is not
merely a profile of a thing but the thing itself, even though it is in principle
impossible  «that  a  perceptual  object  could  be  given  in  the  entirety  of  its
sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained
perception» (Hua 11, 3). In this sense, then, it lies in the essence of perception
to outstrip itself;  besides  the manifold of  perceptual  profiles,  it  always also
gives unity of that manifold.
This unity, however, is not at any time given completely, that is, it is never
fully  determined.  Perceptual  unity  remains  open in the continual  course of
further  perceptions;  it  is  a  “horizonal”  unity  that  at  any  moment  includes
echoes and anticipations of other possible profiles of the same object that could
be  brought  to  genuine  appearance  but  currently  are  not.  The  “object”  of
perception is that which “coincides” as “the same” in that manifold of profiles.
It thus lies in the essence of perceptual objects that they are
intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is,
[that  they  are]  surrounded  by  a  halo  of  emptiness…that  is  not  a
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nothingness,  but  an  emptiness  to  be  fill-out;  [...]  a  determinable
indeterminacy. (Hua 11, 6 – my italics)
This  might  at  first  glance  not  look  like  much  more  than  a  (noematic)
restatement  of  Husserl’s  analyses  of  internal  time-consciousness.  To  the
contrary, it far exceeds a purely formal analysis (in the Kantian vein) of the
necessary conditions of unity. Indeed, the structure of time-consciousness is a
necessary condition for the possibility of “coincidence” of the “same” in the
continual course of perception. Only because consciousness and, correlatively,
everything that can be something for consciousness is constituted in overlapping
temporal horizons, can coincidences emerge at all (cf. Hua 11, 72f.). Even so,
however,  this  temporal  structure  is  purely  formal.  It  is  the  structure  «that
necessarily  connects  all  particular  objects  of  which  we  become  conscious
originally in passivity as being», but it does so «no matter what their content may
be and however else they may be constituted as unitary objects  with respect to
content» (Hua 11, 127 – my italics). A full clarification of coincidence, however,
demands more. Husserl must show how it is not only formally but  concretely
possible for different profiles of objects and different contents of consciousness
to coincide. In other words, he must explicate the eidetic laws of coincidence of
different contents as adumbrations of a unitary objective sense.
Mere  form  is  admittedly  an  abstraction,  and  thus  from  the  very
beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and
its  accomplishment  is  an  analysis  that  works  on  [the  level  of]
abstractions. It grasps, it is only interested in the necessary temporal
form of all … objects, or rather, correlatively it is only interested in the
form of manifolds that constitute the temporal object… But what gives
unity  to  the  particular  object  with  respect  to  content,  what  makes  up  the
differences between each of them with respect to content… – the analysis of
time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely from content. Thus, it does
not give us any idea of  the  necessary synthetic structures of  the streaming
present and of the unitary stream of the presents… (Hua 11, 128 – my italics)
Husserl’s analysis of passive syntheses thus complements his account of the
form of time-consciousness with concrete analyses of coincidence. They reveal
that the process of perception not only follows the formal structure “retention-
impression-protention” but also involves, with respect to its  content,  another
fundamental relation, namely the relation between “emptiness” and “fullness”.
The profiles of the object that have just been, or are yet to come, are, Husserl
puts  it,  “emptily”  co-presented.  They  are  undetermined  (not  “genuinely”
perceived) but not completely unknown either. When I see an object’s front, I
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also see it as an object that has a backside, although I do not know what it
looks like precisely before I look at it. Co-presented profiles are thus in a sense
“prefigured”. However, the significance of the relation between emptiness and
fullness is missed when it is understood as a mere comparative statement that,
as it were, compares two states “from the outside”. Husserl’s important insight
is  not  merely  that  what  is  genuinely  perceived  is  “fuller”  in  determinate
content  than  what  is  only  co-meant.  It  is  rather  that  what  is  genuinely
perceived in “fullness” always already “points ahead” to other, still “empty”,
profiles (in fact, that’s sense of saying that they are “co-meant”),  and that the
thus “empty” horizon of perception is experienced as “to be fulfilled”. Regarded
“from inside” that relation,  i.e.,  in terms of  how it  is experienced,  it becomes
evident  as  a  teleological  “dynamic  transition”  (Hua  11,  12)  from  empty
intentions towards their fulfillment. This “dynamic transition” is itself based on
a  synthesis  of  coinciding,  namely  the  coinciding  of  what  is  intended,  first
emptily and then fulfilled. Without that coincidence, the fulfillment would not
be registered as such; it would not be taken as the fulfillment of what had been
emptily intended. The teleological thrust of perception means that «perception
drives at fashioning a unity» (Hua 11, 9 – my italics) and that it does so without
being driven by a conscious Ego.
Husserl has thus identified another, non-formal transcendental condition of
sensible  unity:  «Considered  concretely,  as  in  process,  the  perceptual  lived-
experience is  continuously being fulfilled,  and precisely for  that  reason, it  is  a
unity of continual concordance» (Hua 11, 66 – my italics). The «directedness», or
«striving» (Hua 11, 83 and passim) of perception, in turn, is in part due to fact
that consciousness experiences the process of perception as an ongoing process
of  knowledge;  «the  process  of  fulfillment  …  is  also  a  process  of  knowing
something more closely» (Hua 11, 8),18 of gaining evidence for it. It has the form
of  motivation.  What  is  genuinely  perceived  motivates  other  possible  profiles;
what is emptily given motivates its fulfillment in further acts of consciousness.
However,  while  motivation  can  be  identified  as  a  concrete (as  opposed  to
formal) and dynamic (as opposed to static) possibility condition, it does not yet
give  a  full  clarification  of  the  emergence  of  coincidence,  which  Husserl
attempts in his analyses of association. 
18 In fact, to be more precise, the striving that is inherent in perception is two-fold. It is, on
the one hand, a strictly speaking epistemic striving (Erkenntnisstreben) and, on the other
hand, a striving after realization (Verwirklichungsstreben). That is, it is pulled towards a
«verified intending (bewährte Meinung)» and towards a «grasping the object itself » (Hua
11, 88). Husserl thus finds in perception evidence in nuce for his notion of a “teleology of
reason”, which receives its fullest explication in the Crisis. 
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Association is  commonly understood as the process by which «something
reminds one of  something else»  (HUSSERL 1973,  75 [§16]).  However,  Husserl
complements this empirical sense of association with a transcendental one. In
this  transcendental sense,  “original”,  or “primary association” (Hua 11,  151,
273) is understood not as the process in which different contents are associated
with one another but as the «immanent genesis» (HUSSERL 1973, 74 [§16]) of
content itself. It refers to the different ways in which moments of consciousness
“point to” one another and blend into one another as one  – «even though there
is still not an actual relation of indication by signs and designation» (Hua 11,
121).  The  various  basic  syntheses  of  association  (e.g.,  similarity/contrast,
fusion/prominence, etc.) thus are the concrete «preconditions of content» (Hua
11, 180). However, contrary to Kant’s belief that these syntheses only have unity
in virtue of the synthetic unity of apperception, Husserl discovers that they,
and therewith the given that manifests in them, have their own regularities. In
reflection, we are able to trace «a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that
constantly belongs to consciousness in general» (Hua 11, 117; cf. HUSSERL 1973,
§16).  This  makes  association,  in  which  different  moments  of  consciousness
come together  as  belonging  together,  «a  fundamental  concept  belonging  to
transcendental phenomenology» (Hua 1, 114)19. It is neither the ultimate reason
nor the constitutive principle, and also not a formal possibility condition, but
the  concrete process by which  the given articulates itself into sensible unities of
coinciding.  To  say  that  these  are  “sensible”  unities  is  to  say  that  they  are
experienced  as  unified  prior  to  and  independently  from  any  intellectual
understanding of them. 
We have to keep in mind the same distinction here that was also needed to
understand  properly  the  relation  between  emptiness  and  fulfillment  as  an
intentional  relation.  Equally,  the  significance  of  association,  e.g.,  in  terms  of
similarity, is missed when it is understood, as it were, “from the outside” as an
external relation between two states that are viewed as similar. In that case, we
run into the problem Husserl struggled with in his discussion of association in
earlier  texts.  For  example,  in  a  lecture  course  from  1904/5  Husserl  indeed
describes the principles of association as combining presentations that «lack
intrinsic affinity» and that are related to the objective sense of perception only
19 Husserl  had  recognized  the  importance  of  association  as  early  as  in  the  Logical
Investigations. There he speaks of the «felt mutual belongingness» of experiences (Hua 19,
I  §4;  II  §34)  but  is  not  yet  able  to  give  a  deep  clarification  of  the  phenomenon.  In
Experience and Judgment, Husserl himself refers to the discussion of indication (Anzeige) in
the  Logical Investigations as the «nucleus of genetic phenomenology» (HUSSERL 1973, 75
[§16].) 
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«extrinsically  and  indirectly»  (Hua  38,  35).  As  Stephen  Crowell  has  recently
pointed out, this early account of association, modeled on signitive relations
(which are extrinsic) actually leaves us in the dark as to what prevents these
associations  from being arbitrary.20 In  my view,  Husserl’s  important  insight
(and the advancement of his later theory over earlier attempts to capture the
phenomenon of association) is that, as it were, “from inside” of the associative
synthesis,  i.e.,  in  terms  of  how  it  is  experienced,  different  moments  of  the
emerging  unified  content  are  given  as  intrinsically belonging  together.
Association  is,  according  to  Husserl's  mature  account,  a  «purely  immanent
connection» (HUSSERL 1973, 75 [§16]).21
Primary association displays the same correlation as all  intentionality:  the
given  articulates  itself  as  given  for  consciousness. At  its  most  concrete,  this
correlation manifests in affection, which is the “Ur-Stiftung” and driving force
of  primary  association.  Husserl  makes  it  very  clear  that  the  motivational
structure  by  which  consciousness  “strives  for”  unity  is,  at  the  same  time,
“pulled” by the “object” (which at the most basic level may be not more than a
“prominence” in the perceptual field).   In order to illustrate the force of the
object’s pull and in order to impress on us its essential role in the process of
perception, Husserl even lends the “object”22 its own voice:
There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let
your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me
up; keep on looking [at] me over again and again, turning me to see all
sides. You will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface
qualities, all my inner sensible qualities, etc. (Hua 11, 5)
[…] Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your
place, changing the position of your eyes, etc. You will get to see even
more of me […] (Hua 11, 7)
I said earlier that consciousness is “passive” in a double sense. Here the second
sense, in which it experiences the “given” as asserting itself, comes to the fore.
This does not mean that the object “causes” any events in consciousness but
rather that it “motivates” certain syntheses. Besides the associative syntheses
20  Cf. CROWELL 2013, 133-135.
21 Crowell doubts that Husserl’s later account solves the problems of the early one thereby
challenging the significance of the difference between extrinsic significatory association
and intrinsic primary association (CROWELL 2013, 139-140). 
22 I put “object” into quotes because we are at this level not yet talking about full-fledged
objects  yet.  In  fact,  because  we  are  talking  about  the  most  basic  beginnings  of
constitution, it would be more accurate to speak simply of the “non-ego”, as Husserl
himself does in a manuscript of 1931 (Ms. C 10 15b; also quoted by ZAHAVI 2003, 73). 
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(which underlie  all acts  of consciousness),  these also include, in the case of
perception in particular, kinaesthetic ones, which are always correlated with
perceptual  ones.  In  perception,  then,  “unity”  of  coincidence  arises  in  a
«constitutive duet» (Hua 11, 52) involving, on the one hand, the emerging unity
of the “objectlike” sense, and, on the other hand, the autopoietic unity of the
“lived body”. In this “duet”, pace Kant, the “object” sets the tone: an affection
always  «precedes  the  receptive  action»,  i.e.,  the  ego’s  «turning toward»  the
object (Hua 11, 84). In fact, the “ego” is only «“awakened” in response to an
object» (Hua 11, 145).23 Or, to be more precise, the associative “Ur-stiftung” is
relational.  In affection,  as its  most  concrete manifestation,  the “correlational
Apriori” plays out as the dynamic back-and-forth of the object’s «affective force
(affektive Kraft)» and the ego’s «responsivity (antwortende Tätigkeit)» (Hua 11,
50). This means that consciousness is passive in yet a third sense, namely in the
sense that the object in part  directs the course of perception. As Donn Welton
puts it, in perception my experience
is simultaneously one of mastering and being mastered, of actions and
resistance, of invading and being invaded. In the case of perception I
not only act but I am acted upon, I not only effect but I am caught up in
a larger realm of affectivity.24
This  also  means  that  “the  given”  is,  in  Husserl’s  analysis,  more  than  the
“matter” of cognition. Not only does the given display “unity of coincidence”
prior to the Ego’s «act of putting various presentations with one another and of
comprising  their  manifoldness  in  one  cognition»  (A77/  B103).  It  is  itself  a
“player” in perception, not a mere “cause”, but a “motive”, as Merleau-Ponty
puts it later.25
At  its  most  rudimentary  level  as  “non-Ego”,  it  is  constituted  as  simple
«prominence (Abhebung)» that «takes place through fusion under contrast with
respect to content» (Hua 11, 149). However, such prominences are not merely
cognitive unities  (e.g.,  of  sensations),  but  also  affective ones;  «as unities for
themselves they are eo ipso also for the ego, affecting it» (Hua 11, 162 f.). What
is prominent has salience for consciousness. It holds «allure for consciousness
23 Of course the “ego” meant in this context is not the active Ego (for whom the expression
is usually reserved). Husserl uses the term “primal ego” in the same text in which he
speaks of the “non-ego” (see fn. 22). However, it is appropriate to speak of an “ego” in
this  “primal”  sense  insofar  as  the  affected  consciousness  is  not  indifferent  but
“awakened” and “responsive”  –  even though it is not active yet. 
24 WELTON 2000, 243
25 MERLEAU-PONTY 2002, 36.
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(bewußtseinsmäßiger Reiz)»; it exercises a «pull (Zug)» on the ego (Hua 11, 148).
This may set into motion an entire cognitive process, in which «the ego turns
toward  it  attentively,  and  progresses  from  here,  striving  toward  self-giving
intuition,  disclosing more and more of  the  self  of  the object,  thus,  striving
toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object»
(Hua 11, 148 f.). However, this is only the «most privileged case» (Hua 11, 151).
It may also simply not be strong enough to actually attract attention (cf. Hua
11,  153,  163);  or  the  ego  may  be  paying  attention  to  something  else.  The
question of when a particular affective unity, i.e., a particular object formation,
rises above the threshold of the ego’s attention and  which one will do so, is
unpredictable  –  we  are  talking  about  processes  of  “motivation”  and
“awakening”, and not of cause and effect. Husserl mentions noematic factors,
such as the «size of contrast», but also noetic ones, such as the Ego’s instincts,
drives and desires that will  influence the strength of any given salience (cf.
Hua 11,  150).26 However,  that such affective  «unities  must  be  constituted in
order for a world of objects to be constituted in subjectivity at all», Husserl
believes is certain (Hua 11, 162).
The fact that Husserl does not give an explanation from “first sensations”,
prior to association, should not be surprising. Husserl remains faithful to his
early “Gestaltist” intuitions.27 The “associated” whole is prior to its parts; the
notion of “bare” sensations is the result of analytic thinking (as Merleau-Ponty
so forcefully reminds us in the introduction to his Phenomenology of Perception).
What’s more, in the living present of consciousness, the perceptual field always
includes  a  multiplicity  of  such  prominences;  there  is,  as  Husserl  puts  it,  a
whole «relief of salience» (Hua 11, 167). Further, that relief is always already
multi-layered because  it  never happens,  as  it  were,  “for  the first  time” and
never “once and for all”:
every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in
the realm of the … dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner
of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process
receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in
the  final  acquisition  of  the  retentional  synthesis,  becomes  steadily
sedimented. (Hua 11, 178)
26 Husserl remarks on the fact that at this point the analysis slides into «a phenomenology
of the so-called unconscious» (Hua 11, 154), which is obviously problematic.
27 Already  in  Philosophy  of  Arithmetic,  Husserl  speaks  of  a  “unitary  intuition”  of  an
individual object, which is a «whole, with regard to the fact that subsequent analysis
discovers in it a multiplicity of parts» (Hua 12, 195).
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The  way  in  which  these  different  layers  come  to  bear  on  each  other  in
perception is explicated by Husserl in his account of “types”, which is meant to
capture the sense in which the dynamic of  fulfilment always already has a
history.  Not  only  has  “originary  association”,  as  it  were,  always  already
happened,  but  it  is  also  always  already  fulfilling  (or  disappointing)  tacit
expectations generated by, not necessarily immediately, preceding experiences.
In accordance with what is given to consciousness retentionally, there is
“to be expected” something new on its way having a uniform style….it
is characterized as in accordance with what has been […]. (Hua 11, 186)
Perception  therefore  is  neither  a  mental  state,  nor  a  mere  process,  but  a
continuous  practice. The appropriate response to an affection is not a change
from one mental state to another,  or the inevitable unfolding of a triggered
event, but precisely a “response” (for example, a shift of attention) within an
ongoing practice of perception. As a practice, perception has a habitual history
with  an  inherent normative  dimension.  It  has  a  history  that  prefigures  its
presence and future of fulfillment. This history is a history of “typification”. In
fact,  in  Experience  of  Judgment Husserl  speaks  of  the  entire  perceptual  field
(regarded not  only  synchronically,  but  also  diachronically)  as  a  «totality  of
typification  (Totalitätstypik)  (HUSSERL 1973,  36  [§8]).  The  normativity  of
typification – Husserl also speaks of its «concrete Apriori» (Hua 1, 114) – is
indeterminate but not arbitrary;  «in the flux of intentional  synthesis  (which
creates  unity  in  all  consciousness  and  which,  noetically  and  noematically,
constitutes unity of objective sense),  an essentially necessary conformity to  type
prevails» (Hua 1, 86 f.).
Our expectations may be disappointed; they may let us perceive what is not
there, or not perceive what is there. However, Husserl is interested not in the
question whether a single perception is veridical or not, or how it can be. He is
interested,  rather,  in the  rational  progression of  perception as  a  continuous
practice, which is also a continuous practice of confirmation (Bewahrheitung).28
It is true, then, as Crowell has pointed out, that even if
it is not conceived psychologically or causally, association is not the sort
of thing that can be said to succeed or fail: contents just are or are not
associated as similar, continuous, or whatever, and by itself this cannot
28 «In a certain respect,  the untrue,  the  non-being is  already eliminated in passivity.  A
thoroughgoing  consciousness  of  one  and the  same world  comes  into  being  through
revisions and corrections» (Hua 11, 98). 
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lead to “anticipations” that may or may not be fulfilled.29
However,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  reduces  the  relevant  normativity  of  the
continuous practice of perception «to covariance relations between systems of
appearances in consciousness», namely between kinaesthetic and presentative
sensations.30 For that correlation always already implies a reference point that
surpasses both systems of appearances: the thing itself, which is the telos and
as such a norm of perceptual practice. It is an ideal norm because it lies in the
essence of the perceptual object to transcend any perceptions we may have of it,
but it is a norm nonetheless. Practices of perception do not themselves generate
the  norm  but  they  constitute  different,  more  or  less  appropriate,  modes  of
attempting to reach it and to bring it – i.e, the object, the norm – to appearance.
«A being that can be legitimated, a true being in itself, lies at the basis of all of
this; all error, all illusion has its norm in a hidden truth, but a truth that is to be
attained» (Hua 11, 214). In passivity, this truth comes to appearance through
syntheses  of  coinciding  in  which  already  established  coincidences  have
normative pull; they function as “attractors”, at least to the extent that they
motivate  senses  of  fulfilling  (i.e.,  as  confirming  the  ongoing  perception)  or
disappointing (i.e., as challenging the ongoing perception).
For Husserl the perceptually given is thus, even insofar as it is given, far from
being merely contingent. In fact, it has its own laws. «It designates a realm of the
“innate” Apriori» that does not have its origin in an ego’s understanding but,
conversely,  «without  which  an  ego  as  such  is  unthinkable»  (Hua  1,  114).
 Husserl believes that the necessities we actively grasp in judgments have their
ultimate origin in these necessary structures of perception. What’s more, the
necessities of perception are apparent to us; we are aware of them passively in
the ways in which we anticipate the perceptual world to be a certain way and
in which we expect ourselves to be able to access it in prefigured modes of
perceptual practice. To speak like some contemporary Heideggerians, we know
these necessities practically in the mode of, more or less successful, “absorbed
coping”. Husserl’s notion of syntheses of coincidence refers to the processes
and practices that disclose the unities of the perceptually given in necessary
ways, i.e., in ways that are essential to the perceptually given. 
However, the perceptually given also always already points beyond itself at a
different  kind  of  necessity,  namely  the  eidetic  necessity  of  its  respective
essence.  While  for  Husserl  «individual  existence  of  every  sort  is  [...]
“contingent”», for him, contingency is only “the other face” of necessity. Any
29 CROWELL 2013, 140.
30 CROWELL 2013, 143.
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empirical  thing is contingent precisely because,  while  it  is  thus,  it  could be
otherwise, which means “otherwise” «in respect of its essence» (Hua 3, 9). His
statement, in Ideas I, that everything contingent is also «governed throughout
by a fixed set of ideal laws (durchherrscht von fester Wesensgesetzlichkeit)» (Hua 3,
298)  can thus be understood in at  least  two different  senses.  There are  the
“typical”  necessities  inherent  in  perception  itself,  but  there  are  also  the
“essential”  necessities  which  perception  “emptily”  indicates.  Those  too  can
become apparent to consciousness, namely in “eidetic intuition”, which is an
accomplishment of the active Ego but which nonetheless finds fulfilment in
given coincidences – coincidences not of perception, but of imagination.
2.3. Coincidence of Essences: Passivity in Husserl’s Notion of Eidetic Intuition
Husserl believes to have discovered generalities on all levels of objectivity. In
fact,  even on the  most  basic  level  of  originary association,  understood as a
synthesis of the similar with the similar, the given is imbued with an air of
generality  insofar  as  this  association  already  implies  a  disregarding  of
difference between the moments thus associated as well as a sense of affinity
amongst  them.  The  unity  of  what  is  perceptually  given  «is  not  a  mere
assemblage of distinct givens, but already in the passivity of its preconstitution
it essentially includes a bond of internal affinity» (HUSSERL 1973, 322 [§81a]).
Different moments of this affinity may be considered in their likeness, but their
unity of  coincidence also gives a sense of  their participation in a generality
which is common to both (cf. HUSSERL 1973, 327 [§81c]) – a sense of “what” they
are.  This  generality itself  can become evident as  an object  of  intuition in a
process Husserl calls “eidetic intuition (Wesensanschauung)”.
Any such What can […] be “put into an idea.” Experiencing, or intuition
of  something  individual can  become  transmuted  into  eidetic  seeing
(ideation)  [...]  What  is  seen  when  that  occurs  is  the  corresponding
essence, or Eidos [...] (Hua 3, 10).
Eidetic intuition thus makes explicit what is already implicit in the experience
of an individual “something” as manifesting a “whatness” in addition to its
“thisness”; we see it  as being of a certain kind. What distinguishes Husserl's
account  – above all  from Kant's  –  is  that  Husserl  does  not  conceive  of  the
“whatness” of individuals as conceptual (although he does not deny that it can
be conceptualized). As Sokolowski puts it so well:
A concept works among meanings and judgments and inhabits [...] the
apophantic  domain,  while  an  essence  works  [...]  among  what  is
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intended through meanings. It inhabits the ontological domain.31
According to Husserl, any object, by virtue of being contingent, has «its essence
(sein Wesen)» (Hua 3,  20), i.e.,  «its stock of  essential predicables which must
belong to it [...]  if other, secondary, relative determinations can belong to it»
(Hua 3, 9f.; my italics). 
The fact that the eidos inhabits the ontological domain also means that it can
be considered an object in its own right. We can not only think it, but also make
it evident, i.e., “see” it. The essence that is implicit in the “whatness” of the
individual can
be transformed, by methodical thinking, into a pure eidos [...] when we
no more consider the essence as exemplified in this thing before us, but
take it  as an object  sui  generis that  is  independent of  the actual  and
possible instantiations.32
This  transformation  requires,  as  Mohanty  says,  “methodical  thinking”.
Essences are grasped in active syntheses of an Ego who is after identifying and
describing those essences. Essences are therefore, in a specific Husserlian sense
of the expression, «products of reason» (Hua 1, 112). 
However, we do not find them as real objects in the world; they are ideal
objects  which  we  recognize  «by  means  of  subjective  processes  that  are
specifically acts of the Ego» (Hua 1, 111). However, this does not mean that we
make them up or that we construct them out of thin air. We do not project them
onto  the  world  of  experience.  It  is  perhaps  less  misleading  to  call  them
“results”  of  active  cognitive  operations  that  are  directed  towards  their
identification.  Like  the  “results”  of  a  scientific  experiment,  they  are,  if  the
experimental method is adhered to correctly, not taken as “created” by those
operations  but  as  “discovered”  in  them  (cf.  Hua  1,  108).  This  sense  of
discovery, that is, the insight that an essence (e.g., “perceptual object as such”)
actually regulates  the domain attributed to it  and in the ways identified in
eidetic intuition (e.g., as transcending any of its possible perceptions) is based
on an identification between what is intended as such an essence and what is
given in intuition as  the fulfillment  of  this  intention.  This  is  precisely  why
Husserl insists that we must be able to “see” an essence. By being intuitable as
“given” (and not merely constructed) the essence find its only phenomenolo-
gically legitimate validation, namely the fulfillment of what otherwise be at
best an empty concept of it.
31 SOKOLOWSKI 1974, 68.
32 MOHANTY 1997, 11.
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This fulfillment, however, can only be understood if we recognize that eidetic
intuition has not only active but also passive moments. Essences are disclosed
to us independently from any efforts we might make to identify and determine
them. “Seeing” essences is, for Husserl, as quotidian and mundane as “seeing”,
i.e., “intuitively” grasping, that 2 + 2 = 4, or that the spatial object in front of me
must have more sides than the ones I can presently see. «The truth is that all
human beings see “ideas,” “essences,” […] – except that from their epistemolo-
gical standpoint they interpret them away» (Hua 3, 41). It might be difficult to
accept  that  we do because  our  epistemological  preconceptions might  let  us
believe that we cannot (e.g., because we are convinced that we can only “see”
what  is  given to  us  perceptually).  The possibility  of  eidetic  intuition might
therefore be, as Husserl puts it in a phrase that spectacularly underplays the
degree of disbelief  with which his  idea has been met by critics  to this  day,
«strange to  the tradition-bound» but  «phenomenologically  evident»  (Hua 1,
114).
What is evident here is not only that we can grasp such evidences, but that
we are able to distinguish between the active identification of an essence and
its fulfillment in the way it is “given”. In fact, “identification” here means the
identification of what we suppose something to be with what it gives itself as
being. Thus, «anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest
level, a passivity that gives something beforehand» (Hua 1, 112).33 Only due to
this  correlation  can  anything  actively  be  recognized  as that  which  is  also
passively  given,  and  thus  not as  “merely”  constructed.  Only  due  to  the
possibility of a passive synthesis of coincidence is it possible, in Husserl’s view,
to “demonstrate” the validity of an active synthesis and to do phenomenology
as a “rigorous science” with a «purely intuitive [...]  mode of demonstration
[that] excludes all “metaphysical adventure”, all speculative excesses» (Hua 1,
166). 
Husserl gives quite explicit descriptions of the process of eidetic intuition.
Generally speaking, its aim is to identify the invariant, i.e., essential, features of
objects or experiences in a process of “free variation”. We ask:
33 Husserl’s distinction between a synthesis of identification and a synthesis of coincidence
has a certain affinity, which he himself notes, with Kant’s distinction between a synthesis
of recognition (in the concept) and a synthesis of apprehension (in intuition) in the A-
deduction.  However,  it  must  again  be  noted  that  Husserl  disagrees  with  Kant  both
insofar as he sees no reason for a fundamental separation between the intellectual and
the intuitive and insofar as he can find no evidence for the claim that intuitive synthesis
must necessarily be “subject to” laws of the understanding. 
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In  such  free  variations  of  a  paradigm,…  what  remains  kept  as  the
invariant,  the  necessary  universal  form,  the  essence-form,  without
which something of this sort … would be entirely unthinkable as an
example of its kind? (Hua 9, 72)
While in his early writings, e.g., in the second Logical Investigation, he still finds
it relatively unproblematic to take some real individual as the starting point for
such variations he later emphasizes the risks of distortion this brings. Hence he
comes to insist that the “pure eidos” is only discoverable if we
so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities,
the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with “pure” possibilities, pure
of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever. (Hua 1,
104)34
The aim is not to arrive at a mere generalization from empirical facts, but at the
“pure eidos”, which prescribes for any of its possible actualizations how it can
be  what  it  is  «with  absolute  “essential  universality”,  and  with  “essential
necessity”» (Hua 1, 105). To this aim, Husserl believes, we must begin with an
arbitrary  example,  that  is,  with  an  example  that  is  precisely  not  wilfully
selected and not taken from experience – a merely possible token of the type
whose essence one is attempting to identify and describe. Only its arbitrariness,
into which it is liberated by the deliberate shift from actual examples to pure
possibilities,  prevents  the  investigator  from  selecting  examples  that  would
favour a certain result. While, as we have seen, Husserl believes that essences
are always already disclosed in the experience of real individuals, the method
of “eidetic intuition” is conceived by Husserl as a process by which the essence
thus  disclosed  «must  from  the  outset  be  freed  from  its  character  of
contingency» (HUSSERL 1973, 340 [§87]). We must, as Sokolowski puts it, «flush
the eidos» out of the contingent variants.35
The ego is active here in more than one sense. It follows an explicit cognitive
interest due to which «what differentiates the variants remains indifferent to
us» (HUSSERL 1973, 341 [§87]). However, due to the transition into the realm of
pure possibility it is also liberated by an «act of volition» to produce variants
that transgress the boundaries of actual experience (ibid.). The ego is thus not
just active, as it is in all judgments, but it is free. Husserl speaks of a «specific
freedom of essential  seeing…in which we are  not  bound by the conditions  of
unanimity in the same way as in the progress of experience» (HUSSERL 1973, 344
34 See also: Hua 9, 74f.; HUSSERL 1973, 424.
35 SOKOLOWSKI 1974, 79.
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[§87d]). The arbitrariness of the variants and the freedom of essential seeing
culminate in the  intuition of  an open infinity,  namely the  «remarkable and
truly important consciousness of “and so on, at my pleasure”» which signals
that «it is a matter of indifference what might still be joined to it» – the essence
has become evident (HUSSERL 1973, 342 [§87b]). 
The insight that no further variants will make a difference to the now evident
essence  is  pivotal.  It  turns  the  variants  from  being  seen  as  examples  that
specify an empirical generality, which remains open to correction by further
variants,  into becoming evident as  instances that  are specified by an  a priori
eidos, which prescribes, prior to and independently from any of its particular
actualizations, the laws to which all of its instances must conform.36 The whole
point  of Husserl’s  insistence that this  “turn” is  intuited is a  point about the
validity of that insight. Methodologically, everything depends for Husserl on
the claim that he already makes in the Logical Investigations, namely that «this
we do not merely think, but we see it to be true» (Hua 19, 831 [VI §65]).
Whatever one might think of this fundamental conviction,37 this “seeing it to
be true”, if it is to be “scientific” in the Husserlian sense, depends on passive
moments in eidetic intuition.38 Active syntheses of identification always receive
their validation, i.e., their fulfillment, in passive syntheses of coinciding. These
passive  syntheses  do  not,  therefore,  exclusive  belong  to  the  pre-predicative
sphere, which is a comparatively uncontroversial claim, but also to the highest
levels of reason, namely the levels of a priori cognition. In eidetic intuition they
disclose a necessary unity in the free variants. Husserl is very clear about this:
In this transition from image to image, from the similar to the similar,
all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence in the order
36 Cf. WELTON 2005, 45.
37 What to Husserl is arguably the single most important methodological point of his entire
phenomenological  work also  is  precisely what disqualifies his  work,  and perhaps all
phenomenology, in the eyes of others. Julius Kraft, a contemporary critic of Husserl, had
it in mind when he described phenomenology as a «philosophy that throws overboard
critical  judgment  for  imaginary intuitions  and even renews long obsolete  quibblings
about essence and existence in the style of the middle ages», which in his eyes makes it at
best an «inexact empirical science with metaphysical frippery,» at worst a manifestation
of the dangerous «revulsion of the 20th century against reason, knowledge, and truth»
(KRAFT 1975).  It  is  also  what  led Theodor  Adorno  to  speak  of  the  dangerous
“irrationalism” that lies at the heart of phenomenology (ADORNO 1982, 200). Both Kraft
and Adorno – who saw in Scheler and especially Heidegger the confirmation of their
worst  fears  in  this  regard  –  only  expressed  concerns  that  are  shared  also  by  many
contemporary critics. These concerns still deserve profound consideration. 
38 Ichiro Yamaguchi already emphasized this point (YAMAGUCHI 1982, 62ff.). 
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of their appearance and enter  in a purely passive way,  into a synthetic
unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then
as arbitrary sequences of particulars  in which the  same universal  is
isolated as an eidos (HUSSERL 1973, 343 [§87b] – my italics).
If this could not happen in this way, then eidetic intuition simply would not be
possible.
Only in this continuous coincidence does something which is  the same
come to congruence, something which henceforth can be seen purely
for itself. This means that it is  passively preconstituted as such and that
the seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive apprehension of what is
thus preconstituted – exactly as in every constitution of objectivities of
the understanding, and especially of general objectivities. (Ibid.)
Within  the  phenomenological  framework,  this  is  the  only  guard  against
philosophical  speculation  –  the  only  reason  we  are  not  left  with  empirical
science, logic or fantastical speculation as our only alternatives. While for Kant
everything hangs on the “transcendental unity of apperception”, for Husserl it
all hangs on the fortunate circumstance that «we need not ourselves actively
and  expressly  bring  about  the  overlapping»  coincidences  that  disclose
necessary unities of contingent manifolds, «since […] it takes place of itself in a
purely passive way» (ibid.).
However,  there  is  not  only  a  constraining  condition  for  eidetic
phenomenology,  there  is  also  an  enabling  one.  This  is  the  freedom  of  the
imagination, of which Husserl therefore claims that it is the “vital element” of
phenomenology qua eidetic science (Hua 3, 132). For the passive coincidence
emerging from eidetic variation is intuited as “necessary” only insofar as it
withholds the “tests” and “challenges” of free imagination. Sokolowski speaks
of this as the “negative necessity» of eidetic intuition.
This is the negative aspect of free variation: the insight that removal of
certain moment in a variant, or the addition of certain moments to it,
destroys the individual  –  either  totally,  as  a  being,  or  at  least  as  an
instance of the eidos we are trying to isolate.39
The  coincidence  «is  not  registered  as  an  eidos  until  we  have  run  into  the
impossibility» of imagining it otherwise although we are imagining freely. Thus
it is only in free imagination that the boundaries of the imaginable emerge as
constraints  that  are  not  of  a  contingent  but  of  a  necessary  nature.  In  this
39 SOKOLOWSKI 1974, 80.
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function, imagination as free phantasy liberates from actual experiences and
matters of fact; it thus facilitates eidetic, i.e., a priori intuitions. In this sense, it
can be said to have a “transcendental” function for eidetic phenomenology. It
can even be said to have a mediating function. However, it does not mediate
between two separate stems of cognition (as is the case in Kant’s framework)
but  between the  contingency of  matters  of  fact  and the necessity  of  eidetic
truths.
Conclusion
For  Kant «we can know  a priori of  things only what we ourselves  put  into
them»  (Bxviii).  This  is  because  all  necessary structure  that  the  given  might
display it has received a priori through the forms of cognition that lend unity
to various synthesis involved. Besides this, the given is radically contingent. As
sensation it has no order; as appearance its laws are not its own. Husserl’s very
different  method shows him a very different world,  namely a world that is
already  given  as  «governed  throughout  by  a  fixed  set  of  ideal  laws
(durchherrscht von fester Wesensgesetzlichkeit)» (Hua 3, 298). Obviously, the kinds
of  “necessities  of  coincidence”  that  emerge  from  Husserl’s  phenomenology
would have not impressed Kant, who would have had to dismiss them as crude
empirical generalities that at best simply reflect empirically what is really a
“transcendental  affinity”.  Equally,  Kant’s  failure  to  get  into  view  the  deep
structures  of  constitution  and  his  inability  to  grasp  a  critical  and  non-
speculative  meaning  of  “intellectual  intuition”,  renders  his  philosophy
inadequate for Husserl.
Shared  convictions  always  shine  through  –  above  all,  a  commitment  to
transcendental philosophy as a project of “rigorous science” that attempts to
identify  necessary laws  in  a  contingent  world in  reference to  the  necessary
conditions of their knowability. However, this difference is irreconcilable: Kant
thinks of a necessary unity as a unity that receives its necessity “top down”
from  the  “highest  point”  of  reason,  i.e.,  from  the  transcendental  unity  of
apperception. Husserl, on the contrary, thinks of unity “laterally” as a unity of
“coincidence  (Deckung)”,  which  enables  a  priori  cognition  not  only  of
necessities that «reason produces itself according to its own plan» (B xiii), but
also into necessities reason genuinely discovers.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Special Issue, n. I, ch. 1 (2015)
Transcendental Philosophy and the Problem of Necessity                                        79
Abbreviations
Hua Husserliana. Edmund Husserl – Gesammelte Werke.  Nijhoff,  Den Haag,
1950ff.
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